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Introduction
The Dutch cherish a comforting self-image that presents the nation as a well- 
mannered, civilized, and tolerant community of burghers. Dutch history, as it is taught 
at school, reinforces this assumption. The Eighty Years War against Spain (1568-1648) 
is described as a struggle for political independence and as the defining conflict that 
served to establish the Protestant religion as the basis for public life. The rebellion 
against Spain was accompanied by a great freedom of expression, both in the printed 
form as well as orally, which attracted many dissenters from other countries to settle in 
the Dutch Republic.
The seventeenth century is still celebrated as the Golden Age in Dutch history. 
During that era, maritime trade throughout and beyond Europe boosted the national 
economy. Wealthy merchants stimulated arts and sciences to flourish. The trading 
network of the VOC (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie), built on a combination of 
diplomacy and physical force, encompassed large parts of Asia. In the latter half of the 
eighteenth century, however, the Dutch naval presence in those regions rapidly 
eroded, and the Dutch were transformed from a nation of active traders to become a 
nation of bankers. In 1795 the French occupied the country, and after the defeat of 
Napoleon the Republic was turned into a monarchy. As all the nineteenth century 
European revolutions and World War I bypassed Holland, a kind of lethargy spread 
through the nation. Although after 1850 a modernization of the economy was 
gradually initiated, before the Second World War the low countries were still 
predominantly agrarian. The country's social fabric was neatly divided and supported 
by rigid "pillars" of belief, its foreign policy strictly neutral, and its economy in part
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dependent on the profits drained from its main colony, the Dutch East Indies. Rapid 
industrialization after the Second World War generated new prosperity, which 
resulted in the creation of a welfare state.
It is difficult to establish what historical attributes can be persuasively assembled 
into a collective self-portrait of the Netherlands' citizenry.1 As I see it, three aspects still 
dominate Dutch national identity as perceived by the Dutch themselves. Rooted in the 
experience of the Eighty Years War, a strong urge toward independence exists. The 
Netherlands might be called tiny both in the number of its citizens and in geographical 
expanse, but through their magnificent deeds the people continue to assert their own 
destiny. Alongside historic accomplishments as explorers and thinkers, the Dutch 
commitment to tolerance, fostered by a long humanist heritage, also figures as a 
defining characteristic of the country's self-image. Finally, the Dutch have been shaped 
by the Protestant ethic, which elevates virtues such as resilience and the 
entrepreneurial spirit, while also fostering an acute awareness of personal or national 
fallibility and guilt over wrongdoings of the past and present.2 Between these three 
roots of the Dutch national identity continuous interactions take place; probably the 
most important involves the tension between complacency on the one hand and a 
sense of guilt on the other. Sporadic bouts of national uneasiness, incited by the 
commemorations of particular historic acts or periods, can turn the cold-blooded 
Dutchman into a temporary hothead.
General as they tend to be, observations on Dutchness are essential to under­
standing how and why in 1995 widespread public discussions concerning Holland's 
colonial past preoccupied the nation. In the year 1995 the country commemorated a 
great feat: four centuries before the first Dutchmen set out with their ships to procure 
the spices of the Indies. In this same year, it also commemorated a kind of loss: fifty 
years before Indonesia had proclaimed its independence from the Netherlands. 
Throughout the year a public debate on the colonial past took place, with occasional 
eruptions, culminating in the visit of the Dutch Monarch, Queen Beatrix, to Indonesia 
in the month of August. Newspaper articles, columns, and published letters from 
readers both reflected and created divergent opinions among policy makers and 
middle-class intellectuals. A review of Dutch newspaper sources focused on Dutch- 
Indonesian relations sheds light on the issues, the main actors, and the outcomes of 
this collective exploration of national history.
The discussions as they evolved in 1995 have to be examined in the context of 
certain traumatic experiences. When the Japanese invaded Indonesia in 1942, they put 
the entire European population, civilians and soldiers of the Dutch colonial army, 
around 150,000 people, into prison camps. Approximately 14 to 20 percent of those 
incarcerated in the camps died. When the Indonesian revolution started, the first few 
months were dominated by pemuda actions against Dutch, Eurasians, Amboinese, and
1 The most interesting reconstructions of Dutchness have been done by Americans with Dutch ancestors. 
See: S. Schama, The Embarrassment o f Riches: An Interpretation o f Dutch Culture in the Golden Age (New York: 
Knopf, 1987): William Collins 1987; Frances Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the 
Netherlands Indies 1900-1942. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 1995.
2 Until the middle of the nineteenth century the Catholic minority, mainly living in the south of Holland, 
were tolerated but not treated on a equal basis as the Protestants. This explains the dominance of the 
Protestant ethic in shaping Dutch national identity.
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Chinese. The number of Dutch citizens killed in the bersiap-period is estimated at 3,500. 
Meanwhile, the Dutch government tried to keep possession of Indonesia, possibly by 
maintaining it inside a federal political framework. This led to a military conflict with 
the Indonesian Republic, during which more than one hundred thousand soldiers, 
professionals, volunteers, and conscripts were sent from Holland to Indonesia. 
According to Dutch army statistics collected between October 1945 and August 1949, 
2,341 Dutch combatants lost their lives3; this figure compared with the greater toll of 
several hundred thousand Indonesians killed.
When Indonesia's independence was recognized in December 1949, New Guinea 
was excluded from the transfer of power. Until 1963 a bitter struggle, essentially a war 
of words, persisted between the hard-headed Dutch and the passionate Indonesians. 
The living situations of the Dutch and Eurasians citizens still remaining in Indonesia 
deteriorated substantially during these years. Almost the entire Dutch segment of the 
population, approximately three hundred thousand people, left Indonesia before 1958. 
The majority fled to Holland, where they found it necessary to accommodate 
themselves and, usually, to accept a lower social status than they had enjoyed in the 
colony. In 1951 4,500 Amboinese soldiers were shipped out of Indonesia with their 
families for a "temporary stay" in the Netherlands; for these people, residence in 
Holland proved to be permanent, not temporary.
Although at present Indonesia seems remote, the many individuals who have lived 
or fought in Indonesia maintain a substantial presence in Holland. What's more, the 
ugly circumstances that prevailed during the period of time when many of them left 
Indonesia help explain why memories of the past would be so burdened with emotion 
and remorse. A review of the public discussions that took place in Holland during 1995 
can reveal not only characteristics of Dutchness, but also a wide range of pained and 
often evasive personal reactions to the nation's colonial history.
The Dutch War Veterans and a Deserter
In mid-December 1994, the Foreign Affairs Minister in the current tripartite 
coalition government, H. A. F. M. O. van Mierlo, announced that he had given 
permission for an entry visa to be issued to Johannes "Poncke" Princen, a man who 
deserted from the Dutch army in Java in 1948, chose to ally himself with the 
Indonesians, and supposedly killed Dutch soldiers in combat. For forty-six years a visit 
to the Netherlands was denied him, but now, for "humanitarian reasons," die Minister 
had decided to allow the old and sick Princen to visit his relatives in his country of 
origin. The year before, Van Mierlo's predecessor had still refused Princen a visa 
because of his contested role in the Indonesian revolution.
Who is Johannes "Poncke" Princen? Bom in 1925, he grew up in a Catholic family 
in The Hague and studied at a seminary for a couple of years. During the German 
occupation of the Netherlands (1940-45) he tried to escape to England, but was caught 
and imprisoned in Nazi Germany. After the war he was called to serve as a conscript
3 P. M. H. Groen, Marsroutes en drvaalsporen. Het Nederlands militair-strategisch beleid in Indonesia 1945-1950. 
’s-Gravenhage: Sdu 1991, Appendix 12. In Indonesia itself, at the peak of the conflict in 1947,170,000 
Dutch military personnel were present. Besides Dutch land forces sent from Holland, numbering around 
two-thirds of the total, these included members of the Dutch navy and the colonial army.
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in Indonesia, but he refused to go and fled to France. Caught again, he ended up in 
Java and fought on the Dutch side during the first military action. Despite his 
participation in combat, he was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment because of 
his earlier flight to France. In September 1948, Princen followed his principles, his head 
and his heart; he married an Indonesian woman, named Odah, and joined the 
Indonesian forces. He became involved in stealing weapons from the Dutch, and he 
also actively engaged in some fighting. It has never been established that he himself in 
fact killed any Dutchmen. However it is known that his Sundanese wife lost her life 
during a raid carried out by Dutch special troops.
After Independence in 1949, Princen stayed in Indonesia and became an opponent 
of both Sukarno and Suharto. In 1950 he was involved in the suppression of the 
Westerling coup in Bandung. During the Sukarno years he became active in politics 
and served as a member of parliament from 1956 onwards. From 1958 until 1960 he 
was imprisoned because he had protested against the Indonesian army's forceful 
response to the Permesta/PRRI rebellion. In 1962 Princen joined the Liga Demokrasi to 
protest against the dissolution of parliament, which brought him to prison once again. 
In 1966 he was released by the Suharto government. Together with others he founded 
the League for the Defense of Human Rights (LPHAM) and the Organization for Legal 
Aid (LBH), in which capacity he has since developed to become one of Suharto's main 
critics.4
The decision of Van Mierlo in December 1994 to grant Princen a visa provoked the 
Christian-democratic opposition party, CDA (Christen Democratisch Appel), which 
then demanded that the issue be debated in parliament, where the Minister repeated 
his position that he had granted Princen a visa for "humanitarian and health" reasons. 
The CDA expressed its opposition by arguing that Princen's personal interests could in 
no way be compared to the infinitely greater "humanitarian interests" of many 
thousands of Dutch Indie-veterans and their next of kin. The heated exchange of views 
had to be interrupted because of a false bomb alarm.
After the session in parliament the conservative-liberal party W D  (Partij voor 
Vrijheid en Democratie), part of the coalition government, suddenly changed its 
position. This happened after Princen remarked in a newspaper interview that the 
granting of the visa could be interpreted as sign of "understanding." F. Weisglas, the 
party's spokesman, asked Van Mierlo to revoke his decision because "we have still a 
very negative verdict regarding the actions of Mr. Princen at that time and we have 
still a great respect for those who went to Indie." The Party for the Elderly (AOV, 
Algemeen Verbond voor Ouderen) characterized Princen as a "war criminal," but the 
use of this expression was rejected by the chairman of parliament, W. Deetman.5
Both the Christian-democrats and conservative-liberals criticized the Minister for 
his lenience towards Princen. Obviously, this criticism was inspired by the effective 
lobbying of veterans' organizations, such as the Veterans Platform, the Indies Platform, 
and the Association of Former Military Indies Sojourners (Vereniging Oud-Militairen
4 Volkskrant December 23,1994 and October 10,1995; Joyce van Fenema, Poticke Princen. Een kivestie van 
kiezen. ’s-Gravenhage: BZZTdh 1995. LPHAM stands for Lembaga Pembela Hak Azasi Manusia; LBH is 
the Lembaga Bantuan Hukum.
5 Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant (henceforth NRC) December 21,1994; NRC December 22,1994.
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Indiegangers). They claimed that Princen was responsible for at least twenty casualties 
on the Dutch side during the final phase of the war in Indonesia. Some former soldiers 
warned that they were prepared to use violence if Princen dared to set foot on Dutch 
soil. Both major parties seemed prepared to conciliate the veterans' groups, for these 
groups represented th? elderly and more conservative factions within the Dutch 
electorate.
The outcome of this political conflict did eventually allow Princen to pay a visit to 
Holland, however. But this was not the end of the public discord. On his arrival at 
Amsterdam airport, on December 23,1995, Princen was met by a multitude of camera 
teams, protesters, and security agents. Foreign Affairs had asked Princen to keep his 
mouth shut and avoid making any inflammatory remarks so long as he was in the 
country, to avoid further troubles. Princen maintained a politic silence while the public 
discussion continued. Only when it came time for him to depart did he express his 
wish to start up a dialogue with the veterans of the colonial war.6 Settled back in 
Jakarta in January 1995, Princen stated: "I am of the opinion that now the road is clear 
for some sort of rehabilitation. I have been kicked, degraded, spat upon, and sneered at 
for such a long time, that I now claim the right to say: it is not true, I am not a war 
criminal."7
The Failed Political Debate on the Dutch Colonial Past
The public outcry over Princen's visit to Holland and the political discussions 
preceding his arrival incited the chairman of the Dutch parliament, Deetman, in 
January 1995 to call for a political and a public debate on the nation's colonial past. 
Himself very much interested in Indonesia, Deetman was probably moved to make 
this suggestion by some of the opinions that were expressed in the press during the 
Princen-affair. The Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant (NRC) had cynically observed how 
Princen created new opportunities and discussion topics for many television talk 
shows, where argumentative parties got a chance to batter one another, and emotions 
alone apparently justified some people to compare Auschwitz with Aceh. On the other 
hand, if Americans could come to grips with issues raised by the Vietnam deserters, 
and if German and Russian soldiers could together commemorate the battle of 
Stalingrad, why was it not possible to let a man like Princen walk the streets in 
Holland after forty-six years?8 The Volkskrant offered an explanation for this lack of 
tolerance: the deserter from a war that was lost is never honored at home because he 
confronts veterans with memories of their own personal sufferings, sufferings 
sustained in vain. Thus confrontation with such a deserter raises doubts about the 
legitimacy of the past governments that made the wrong choices leading to the defeat.9
Suggestions like Deetman's prompted some politicians to argue for a total 
reassessment and cleanup of the ugly past. In December 1994, Jan Pronk, the socialist 
Minister for Development Cooperation, pleaded for official Dutch recognition of 
August 17 as the true anniversary of Indonesian Independence and also for a public
6 Volkskrant, January 9,1995.
7 Volkskrant, January 10,1995.
8 NRC, December 23,1994.
9 Volkskrant, December 23,1994.
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debate on colonial history.10 Deetman argued that he was in favor of a public debate 
about the way in which Holland reacted towards Indonesian Independence in the 
second half of the 1940s. According to him it was a responsibility of the current 
generation of politicians to take a clear stance on what has happened in Indonesia by 
means of a parliamentary debate.11
A public political debate never materialized. The Christian-Democratic Party 
promptly reacted to Deetman's invitation by saying that they did not feel the need for 
such a debate; after all, they had received no invitation to a debate before the Minister 
announced his decision to grant the visa to Princen. After consultation among their 
own party members, the conservative-liberals also rejected Deetman's proposition. 
Weisglas made the stunning remark that he could not see the use of dredging up the 
past: "I feel no willingness to rewrite history." The chairman of the Veterans Platform 
agreed with this point of view. Claiming to speak on behalf of one hundred and sixty 
thousand veterans, he declared that this process of stirring up of the past should come 
to an end. He stated: "In Holland one always seeks for the one to blame. But to what 
does this fuss lead? It only leads to disunity. I am jealous of Indonesia, where one 
distances oneself from the past and looks to the future."12
The progressive parties took a different stance. Already during the debate on 
Princen's visa, the Labour Party (PvdA, Partij van de Arbeid) supported the idea of a 
discussion on the events that took place between 1945 and 1950. The aim of such a 
discussion, according to the party's spokesman, M. van Traa, should not be to 
determine who was right and who was wrong, but to create a more uniform picture of 
the period. The progressive-liberal party, D66 [Democraten 66], to which the Foreign 
Affairs Minister, Van Mierlo, belongs, declared itself in favor of not only a debate in 
Parliament but also a larger debate in Dutch society. Members proposed congresses be 
organized to give the different parties the opportunity to exchange views; these 
congresses would preferably be scheduled in the weeks intervening between the 
commemoration of Dutch liberation from Nazi occupation (May 5) and the visit of die 
Queen to Indonesia (August).13
But at last the public intervention of Jan Pronk put an end to the possibility that 
there might be a political debate. He declared that the 1945-1950 episode had been "a 
useless colonial war"; politicians at that time had hidden the excesses committed and 
were still responsible for the deceptions and wrongdoings. In response to this 
incendiary declaration, Prime Minister Kok, a fellow party member, stated that he did 
not feel it was necessary to highlight in retrospect the mistakes and wrong actions of 
past governments. He also disliked the idea of imposing new guilts on those who had 
been in Indonesia at that time. Other party members agreed, arguing that it was too 
easy to judge circumstances of the past with the advantage of hindsight.14 A few days 
later, on television, the leaders of the four big Dutch parties jointly announced that 
they would not support Deetman's recommendation for a political debate on die 1945-
10 Volkskrant, December 27,1994.
11NRC, January 9,1995.
12 NRC, January 10,1995.
13 NRC, January 10,1995.
14 NRC, January 13,1995.
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1949 events.15 Apparently this issue was considered to be so important that a personal 
TV message from the top Dutch political leaders became necessary to conclude the 
debate.
Grinding the Colonial Past Collectively
An organized, official political debate on the colonial past did not come off the 
ground in 1995. What did take place, however, was an extensive unofficial discussion 
in the media, a discussion whose outcome must have confused many Dutchmen. The 
public exchange of views triggered by Princen's visit took place in the space of a single 
month, for the publicity rush soon tapered off in February 1995. This peak was only 
followed by a second media spurt in August 1995, when Queen Beatrix visited 
Indonesia.
One could conceptualize the results of the unofficial public discussions by 
imagining that they opened up a set of three boxes of decreasing size that fitted into 
one another. When opened, these boxes revealed an increasing degree of painfulness 
and their contents were of an increasingly private nature. The outer box was on history 
and the role of commemoration. The basic question defining this large box was 
whether a public debate on the colonial past should take place or not. Essentially this 
issue addressed the way in which the Dutch deal with their national past, especially 
the unpleasant episodes of it. The second box, which nested in the first one, was 
shaped by questions concerning the period 1945-1949. It addressed the way in which 
the Dutch handled the war of Indonesian Independence, the decisions taken by the 
politicians at that time, and how the general public should judge events that took place 
in Indonesia at the end of the 1940s. The third, and smallest box contained the issues 
and unforgettable personal conflicts that individuals experienced in those years. A 
large number of Dutch conscripts had to operate in dangerous circumstances, in an 
unfamiliar terrain, with a largely, openly or covertly, hostile population. Apart from 
their direct engagement in battle, many were also involved in peripheral traumatic 
experiences. Some witnessed or carried out acts that now would be labeled as war 
crimes.
It is typical of the generation of Dutch citizens who were in their early twenties in 
1945 that the feelings of guilt, fear, or anger these past experiences still evoke are 
hardly ever spoken about, even within the inner circle of their own families. Feelings of 
guilt were and are constantly repressed; the past in general seems to be taboo. More 
judgments of what happened in 1945-1949 are not welcomed, especially if these 
judgments are proffered by individuals who were not there at the time.
As might be expected, opinions regarding the necessity of a public debate on 
colonial history were incompatible and confused in 1995. On die one hand, people who 
witnessed or were in one way or another involved in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict 
almost unanimously rejected the idea of a discussion on the Dutch colonial past. Most 
outspoken in opposition were, again, the veterans. Typical was the utterance of veteran 
J. Lesterhuis in a newspaper interview:
15 NRC, January 18,1995.
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A national debate serves no interest whatsoever. They will nail us, conscripts, to 
the cross. Why did you go, they will ask us. But in reality the question should be 
reversed: why did politics send us? [ . . . ]  This is the only question I would like to 
be answered officially. A national debate on the other hand would only rake 
through old sores.16
In their unwillingness to participate in a national debate on the colonial past, the 
veterans were supported by others. Oddly enough one of these was J. Verkuyl, a 
leading Protestant missionary in Indonesia during the days of decolonization. He had 
been one of the very few who at that time publicly advocated Dutch moderation 
toward its former colony. This now eighty-seven-year old theologian stated that at first 
he had been gladdened by the proposal for a cleanup of the past but, on second 
thought, he rejected the idea of a public debate. Such a debate would act like a flint 
from which the sparks would be flying around everywhere. It would be better to form 
a committee of wise men and ask them to issue a concluding statement, to be 
pronounced by parliament in the name of the Dutch people.17 The appointment of a 
"commission of wise men": this is a typical Dutch strategy to circumvent difficult 
choices by promoting consensus supposedly on the basis of expertise.
H. Wigbold, a progressive journalist who introduced the war crimes issue to 
television viewers in 1969, underscored this approach. A public debate was super­
fluous since the government should only acknowledge that Holland was wrong at that 
time and should never have sacrificed its soldiers to the venture in Indonesia.18 The 
most cynical view was expressed in a NRC editorial: it would be useless to plow once 
again the sawahs already gone over, driven by a kind of political masochism. The 
desire to undo the past by discussing it again is an illusion.19
The opposite line of reasoning was advocated by mostly younger people. Wigbold 
was directly challenged by another journalist, D. Berts, who argued that there was 
every reason to stage a public debate: if one refuses to learn from the past, one forces 
history to repeat itself. Also, according to him, it would be good if the Dutch would 
unreservedly offer their apologies to the Indonesians, irrespective of whether the 
Indonesians themselves would welcome such an apology and whether the oppressive 
nature of the present Indonesian government would make such an apology seem 
misdirected.20 The anti-colonial novelist Graa Boomsma also joined those in favor of a 
public debate; at that time he was entangled in a libel suit brought against him by the 
veterans' representatives, the result of an interview in which he had compared the acts 
of Dutch soldiers in Indonesia with those of the German SS in Holland during the 
Second World War. Boomsma spoke of the deceptions so often concealed in collective
16 NRC, January 12,1995.
17 NRC, January 17,1995. In 1946, J. Verkuyl published a book on the Dutch-Indonesian conflict in which 
he set out his views. See: J. Verkuyl, De achtergrond van het Indonesische vraagstuk (Den Haag: Daamen 
1946). Besides criticizing the lack of vision of Dutch government figures who had failed to introduce 
political reform before 1942, he set clear guidelines: a suppression of the Republic by war would be 
"immoral and impossible in practice"; the progress of the negotiations should be continued; Dutch 
influence should be used to support and even serve Indonesian authority (pp. 58-61).
18 Volkskrant, January 10,1995.
19 NRC, January 10,1995.
20 Volkskrant, January 14,1995.
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memory and the unexpected violent responses encountered by anyone who challenged 
collective memory, responses of the kind that had confronted him. The goal of a 
debate, he wrote, should be the recognition, understanding, and psychological 
handling of one of the most traumatic periods in the national past.21 R. Haleber, a 
sociologist writing in the same spirit, warned against applying double standards: on 
the one hand the Dutch still commemorate on May 5 every year their own liberation 
from the German occupation in 1945, while they deny that on August 17 in Indonesia a 
similar event is commemorated, i.e. the liberation of Indonesians from Dutch 
occupation. He consequently advocated ending such manipulations of historical facts 
and revising the nation's commemorative celebrations to fit all the facts.22
Regarding the necessity of a national discussion on the colonial past was 
concerned, it soon became clear that the struggle between those in favor and those 
opposed would not be resolved. Be that as it may, no discussion of any depth among a 
substantial part of the population followed and questions asking how the public 
should perceive the Dutch role in Indonesia, and how this perception should affect 
Dutch commemorations of historical events remained unanswered. The issues having 
to do with the morality of colonialism and historical awareness of one's own colonial 
past were more or less silenced by the generation that experienced the conflict in the 
1940s, maybe to sustain the idea that what has been done in the past was "good" or at 
least better than what some other nations did.
The "second box" to be opened in 1995 contained discussions on the 1945-49 
period. Newspaper articles focusing on the question "what really happened?" 
appeared in great numbers. These reiterated information that could have been dis­
covered by the public through all kinds of popular and scientific publications over the 
past few years. Of these sources, the most widely read were books such as Daar werd 
wat groots verricht (There great things were performed) by the journalists C. van Esterik 
and K. van Twist, and the contribution of C. Smit, a lawyer, who in 1976 had published 
a sequel to earlier short studies, entitled De dekolonisatie van Indonesia.23 Interestingly 
enough the Dutch Government itself has from 1969 onwards undertaken an effort to 
inform the public on the decolonization issue. In March 1995 the twentieth and final 
volume of a source edition of official documents on Dutch-Indonesian relations 
between 1945 and 1950 was published by P. J. Drooglever.24 In connection with this 
substantial project, in March 1996 a lavish conference was held in The Hague 
organized by the Royal Dutch Historical Association (Koninklijk Nederlands 
Historisch Genootschap).
Far more provoking than accounts of what had "really" happened between 1945 
and 1950 were other newspaper contributions that reached a verdict judging the
21NRC, January 12,1995. This is the statement read by the author during the trial in which he was 
accused of having insulted the veterans. Later Boomsma was acquitted.
22 NRC, January 17,1995.
23 Chris van Esterik and Kees van Twist, Daar werd wat grootsch verricht o f hoe het Ksminkrijk der Nederlanden 
zijn grootste kolonie verloor (Weesp: Heureka 1980); C. Smit, De dekolonisatie van Indonesia. Feiten en 
beschouwingen (Groningen: Tjeenk Willink 1976).
24 S. L. van der Wal, P. J. Drooglever, and M. Schouten, Ojficiele bescheiden betreffende de Nederlands- 
Indonesische betrekkingen 1945-1950.20 vols. Os-Gravenhage: Nijhoff/Instituut voor Nederlandse 
geschiedenis, 1971-1996).
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events. However, the academic experts who published their verdicts were few, and the 
relative taciturnity of most professional historians on this score was actually quite 
remarkable. Pronk gave his opinion that "a useless colonial war" had been fought; in 
response, the socialist Van Traa rejected his assessment and immediately advocated a 
new investigation by "people who know of these things and those who have been 
there."25 J. de Jong, a Foreign Affairs official with a doctorate in history, counted 
himself (with P. J. Drooglever and P. Groen) among those belonging to the 
"revisionist" school. Rejecting the prevailing black and white image of the period, he 
concluded that after 1945 no colonial war of reconquest had been waged; the events 
could best be described in terms of a policy of gradual decolonization. This policy, 
supported for a long time both by Britain and the United States, was not unethical and 
could be fruitfully compared with the British approach to India.26 In August 
Drooglever published an article on the decolonization in which he reinforced De Jong's 
view by claiming that the Dutch failure was only relative and the main features of their 
policy had not been so bad after all.27 Leiden professor H. Wesseling in the meantime 
pleaded for an analytical approach to decolonization as opposed to a moralistic one, 
for which the time, fifty years later, now seemed ripe. Any historical discussion should 
start with a comparison focusing particularly on the many differences between the 
various colonial nations and their colonies 28
Whereas historians tended toward complacency or demanded a post-moralistic 
debate, a single politician raised his voice to lodge an accusation against himself. In an 
interview, S. Mansholt, who as PvdA Minister of Agriculture was partially involved in 
shaping the Indonesia policy of the 1940s, publicly confessed guilt, saying "we have 
been absolutely wrong" and "no Dutchmen would have been killed in Indonesia if we 
had better listened to the Indonesians." Viewing the whole situation in retrospect, 
Mansholt thought it would have been wiser if he had stepped down as a minister, but 
added that he decided otherwise at that time, although he had struggled with himself 
on this score.29 From another corner of Dutch society, regrets also sounded. In the 
beginning of January 1995, the council of the Protestant churches issued a declaration 
stating that the churches regretted their lack of understanding at the time for the 
Indonesians' legitimate pursuit of their own independence.30
As was the case with the exchange of views on colonial history in general, the 1995 
discussion on the Dutch-Indonesian conflict did not offer many new insights. People in 
Holland still seemed reluctant to reach strong conclusions concerning the manner in 
which they had lost their former colony, Indonesia. Despite the publication of many 
popular and scientific studies on the subject over the years, the nation still lacks a 
coherent picture. The existence of a "pulverized" historical landscape hampers not 
only an understanding of what happened, but why it happened.
25 Volkskrant, January 18,1995.
26 Volkskrant, January 21,1995; See also: J. J. P. de Jong, Diplomatic ofstrijd. Het Nederlands beleid tegenover de 
Indonesische revolutie 1945-1947 (Amsterdam/Meppel: Boom, 1988).
27 Volkskrant, August 19,1995.
28 NRC, August 17,1995.
29 NRC, January 16,1995.
30 Volkskrant, December 30,1994.
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The third, innermost box of ideas to be broken open in 1995 concerned the traumas 
individuals experienced because of violence undergone or committed during the 
colonial war. Most of the veterans still were angry over the lack of understanding that 
had met them when they returned home. They did not like to be reminded of the fact 
that they may have committed war crimes. They were also critical of the Government 
for several reasons. They felt misled by the Dutch authorities who at the time created 
the impression that they were sent overseas for a "good cause," to perform a simple job 
of "maintaining law and order against a few insurgents." Contrary to their 
expectations, they had ended up in a messy war, facing gangs of armed youngsters 
and a hostile population. After having lost the fight/ they were shipped back to the 
Netherlands and were eventually blamed for fighting in pursuit of a "wrong cause."
Several 1995 publications pointed out that the facilities for returning soldiers in the 
late 1940s were very meager or even non-existent. W. J. Hendrix, former conscript and 
co-writer of a book on war crimes,31 observed that low wages and, often, 
unemployment awaited the returnees. Not until 1988 were the Indies veterans honored 
with their own monument in the city of Roermond. Three years later the Foundation 
Service for Veterans (Stichting Dienstverlening Veteranen) was founded.32 In recent 
years cases of so-called post-traumatic stress disorder have been multiplying, often 
after forty years of complete silence on the part of those suffering from war traumas.33
The issue of war crimes has long been kept in silence. This silence was in part due 
to the stance of political parties and coalition governments that did not want public 
attention to be focused on some of the very unpleasant implications of their decisions 
at the time. Scattered information about war crimes committed had reached the 
Netherlands in 1947-1948, but in the Dutch parliament no systematic discussion of die 
nature of Dutch military intervention had been undertaken. In 1947 the government 
started an investigation of atrocities allegedly committed by Dutch troops in South 
Sulawesi. The counter-terror activities pursued by R. Westerling and his men, which 
resulted in several thousand casualties, were collectively excused in a report as a 
"permissible action on behalf of the Dutch administration" and a "military action 
condoned by emergency powers." A second report in 1954 produced a more stem 
verdict and blamed the highest civil and military authorities in the Indies at the time 
for their lax attitude. Both reports remained secret, however, and the Dutch 
government refused to initiate any legal action against those responsible.34
In 1969, the silence blanketing the war crimes issue was briefly lifted by a television 
broadcast in which the ex-soldier, J. E. Hueting, stated that Dutch soldiers in 1947 and 
1948 had committed serious war crimes. The broadcast sparked a debate in parliament, 
and in reaction, the government organized a quick search of the archives, which 
resulted in the publication of a "Memorandum of Excesses" [Excessennota]. This 
memorandum contained a summation of those excesses discovered in the archival 
reports, but no analysis. The Prime Minister P. J. S. de Jong concluded that the
31 J. A. A. van Doom and W. J. Hendrix, 2nd ed. Het Nederlands/Indonesisch conflict. Ontsporing van geweld 
(Dieren: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1983). The first edition appeared in 1970.
32 NRC, January 12,1995.
33 NRC, January 14,1995.
34 Volkskrant, January 11,1995.
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government deplored the excesses that had taken place, but that on the whole the 
military had behaved correctly in Indonesia. The PvdA was not satisfied, however, and 
demanded a parliamentary inquiry into the South Sulawesi affair that would attempt 
to assign responsibility for the action, but this idea did not receive enough support and 
was rejected. Instead, those in authority elected to publish a source edition of the 
archives to bring to light the many political and administrative aspects of the 1945- 
1950 period, after which a final verdict, so it was hoped, would be attained.35
Nearly twenty years later in 1988, another incident forced the nation to look inside 
this darkest "third box." L. de Jong, who was writing an official history of Holland 
during the Second World War, had completed a volume on the Indies which was about 
to be published. A draft version of a chapter was leaked to the press, and it contained 
the phrase "war crimes" referring to acts of extreme violence on the part of Dutch 
soldiers. There was also a section in the book in which file military attempt to liquidate 
the Indonesian Republic was compared with the German occupation of the 
Netherlands. A lot of vehement public discussion, fueled by the veterans, followed. As 
a result, De Jong backed down and replaced the term "war crimes" in his book with 
the less definite term, "excesses of violence" (geweldsexcessen).36
Altogether, it is no wonder that in 1995 the "war crime" issue still remained taboo. 
Besides some reconsideration of issues raised in 1969 and 1988 and the publication of a 
new edition of the "Memorandum of Excesses" by the Leiden historian, J. Bank, almost 
nothing of importance happened. The nation was confronted by only one event of 
some interest when J. van Neden, a former colonel and advisor of the Veterans 
Platform, admitted in an interview on television that dozens of incidents that had 
taken place at the time of the two "police actions" had never been reported. According 
to him, many cases that involved file burning of kampongs and the maltreatment and 
execution of Indonesian POW's had occurred and gone unrecorded. These excesses, 
"inevitable in a situation of war," were still in need of being scientifically researched 
by means of interviews with former servicemen.37 As could be expected, the colonel's 
public confession was not very much appreciated by his fellow comrades-in-arms. The 
veterans' organizations quickly publicly dismissed his statements and rejected his 
recommendation for a search to uncover new facts.
It can be concluded that neither the discussion on the colonial past, nor the 
discussion of the 1945-1950 period, nor the exchange of views on war crimes 
progressed much further in 1995. Indifference and powerful pressures exist within 
Dutch society which preclude a firm political and historical judgment on what the 
Dutch did in Indonesia shortly after the end of the Second World War. In this respect 
politicians but also historians and journalists have failed. Many scholarly studies on 
Indonesia's decolonization have been published, yet these studies have not led to a 
more conclusive historical judgment, nor have many of the experts' judgments been 
communicated to the general public.
35 This is the source edition by Van der Wal and Drooglever mentioned in note 22. The "final verdict" 
which this source publication was expected to facilitate is now forgotten.
36 Volkskrant, January 21,1995; Volkskrant, February 11,1995.
37 Volkskrant, February 11,1995.
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The visit of Queen Beatrix to Indonesia in August 1995
Only rarely did members of the family of Orange, sovereigns of Holland since 
1814, visit the Indies. When he was sixteen, Prince Hendrik made a tour of the Dutch 
East Indies in 1836-7. The critical letters this young man sent to his mother about the 
many shortcomings of the Dutch administration caused the then Governor General D. 
J. de Eerens many a headache.38 In 1919 a committee that named itself "Queen to the 
Indies" was founded in order to lure Wilhelmina on a trip to the Asian tropical colony 
and thus promote the Ethical policy, but in vain. When Nazi Germany invaded 
Holland in 1940, a transfer of the seat of government to the Indies was seriously 
considered, but Queen Wilhelmina refused because she abhorred the tropical heat. 
Moreover, going from Europe to the Indies would also move her too far away from the 
centers of world policy. Decolonization and the strained relations between countries 
during the Sukarno period prevented any royal visit to take place between 1949 and 
1965. Nor was Sukarno allowed to pay Holland a visit, although on various occasions 
he showed a keen willingness to do so. Not long after the New Order had been 
installed, in 1971, a visit by Queen Juliana and Prince Bernhard was carried out in 
response to a state visit by Suharto and his wife to the Netherlands a year before. Their 
tour through the Archipelago was a great success because it underscored the fact that 
the colonial past, one hoped, "had gone forever." The local population cheered the 
royal visitors wherever they came. Since then Prince Bernhard has visited Indonesia 
regularly both as a private visitor and as chairman of the World Nature Fund.39
If official visits of the Dutch royal family to Indonesia have been so rare, why 
would a visit take place precisely in August 1995? National and international public 
opinion could react disfavorably to the event since critics might argue that such an 
official visit legitimized the bleak human rights situation in Indonesia. This might be 
interpreted as a signal for a new phase in Dutch foreign policy since thoughout the 
1980s the issue of human rights was given a high profile. The Dutch stance on this 
issue had even provoked some conflict with the Indonesian government; after the Dili 
shooting, the Dutch suspended aid to Indonesia, and in reaction, Suharto refused 
further Dutch aid in March 1992.40
Although their reasoning was never made public, the Dutch cabinet probably 
decided to send Queen Beatrix to Indonesia for two reasons. First, it wanted to 
normalize relations after the row of 1992. Second, there was a strong lobby at work 
eager to promote Dutch trade and industry. A large delegation of Dutch captains of 
industry, led by the Minister of Economic Affairs, J. G. Wijers, arrived to visit with the 
Queen for several days, and they managed to sign dozens of contracts with a total
38 F. C. Gerretson and W. Ph. Coolhaas, Particuliere briefwisseling tussen J. van den Bosch en D.J. de Eerens 
1834-1840 (Groningen: Wolters I960), pp. 134-135. The Prince was suffering from diarrhea and 
homesickness. Also, the Governor-General complained, he was surrounded by jealous people who infused 
him with wrong ideas on certain persons and subjects.
39 NRC August 15,1995.
40 On November 12,1991, Indonesian soldiers opened fire on a group of demonstrators assembled at the 
burial site of Santa Cruz in Dili, East Timor. Estimates of the number of those killed vary; the Indonesian 
government stated that there had been fifty casualties, but the East Timorese resistance movement 
calculated the number at more than 250. TV pictures of the fleeing crowd were broadcast worldwide. The 
incident provoked a special UN investigation, which incriminated the Indonesian army.
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value of more than one billion Dutch guilders.41 A few days earlier, the Dutch cabinet 
had decided to reserve two hundred million in the national budget to support firms 
that wanted to invest in Indonesia.42 The so-called parallel economic mission was a 
result of a general reorientation in Dutch foreign policy, which has lately begun to pay 
less attention to development cooperation and human rights and more to economic 
interests. Simultaneously, the Dutch aid budget has been reoriented more to Dutch 
business interests and away from humanitarian support for the most impoverished.
The news coverage of the Dutch Queen's visit to Indonesia led to a new outburst of 
newspaper reports covering not only the visit itself, but also some of the more 
fundamental issues concerning the nation's history as a colonial power. By way of 
summation, two foci of public attention can be plotted, one having to do with the 
Queen's visit and the other with decolonization issues.
In the first two weeks of August preceding the Queen's departure, there was 
commotion stirred up by reports that a television news program was going to show 
evidence that in the village of Rawagedeh (West Java) on December 9,1947 more than 
430 people were killed. This was a far greater number than the 150 reported earlier.43 It 
was Lukas Kustario, once called "the tiger of West Java," former commander of the 
First Brigade of the Indonesian Siliwangi division, who exposed the discrepancy and 
described the killings in the village:
On December 9, in the evening hours, Dutch soldiers forced their way into the 
village. The men were assembled on a field thirty meters wide in front of the 
community house. The soldiers asked where Lukas was hanging out and 
threatened to kill the villagers if they would not hand me over to them. When 
everyone remained silent, they opened fire. In cold blood. At that moment most 
victims fell.
Kustario added afterwards that he had counted the bodies himself.44 The public debate 
about Rawahgedeh erupted after a film was shown on Dutch television in which one 
could see veterans returning to certain locations where they professed to have killed 
Indonesians, including ones already taken prisoner.45
In reaction to the statements on Rawahgedeh, called the "Dutch My Lai" in one 
reader's letter, the public prosecutor of Arnhem started an exploratory investigation 
into possible war crimes (a person's legal responsibility for crimes against humanity 
does not lapse with the passage of time).46 A few days later the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs released a UN-document, dated January 1948, on the Dutch military action in 
this village. The names of individuals mentioned in the report, however, were 
rendered illegible. The conclusion of the UN investigation was clear: "the action of the 
Dutch army was intentional and without mercy." As for casualties, the report only 
offered estimates of the numbers: between 150 (Dutch statement) and 433 (figure given
41 Telegraaf, August 21,1995.
42 NRC, August 17,1995.
43 NRC and Volkskrant, August 9,1995.
44 NRC, August 15,1995.
45 Volkskrant, August 5,1995.
46 NRC, August 10,1995; NRC, August 12,1995.
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by the Muslim priest of Rawahgedeh).47 Soon the whole affair blew over again; public 
attention reverted to Queen Beatrix's visit.
During the preparation for the Queen's visit the main issue publicly discussed was 
whether she should offer apologies to the Indonesians for the wrongdoings committed 
during the colonial period and the decolonization episode. In March 1995 an open 
letter to the Crown Prince was published by someone under the pseudonym Multatuli, 
challenging him to breach official etiquette and speak out:
Go there, stand up and speak. Say that Holland confesses guilt of the centuries of 
abuse and exploitation. Say after this that the new indigenous rulers do not 
perform any better. Nusantara is still 'a beautiful horse on which a thief is seated' 
(learn this Indonesian phrase by heart: Negri Insulinde adalah se-ekor kuda yang 
di-tunggangi se-orang pencuri). Read out a fitting passage from my Max Havelaar. 
The crowd will cheer at you. It will be a diplomatic incident. The Government will 
ask you and your parents to leave. I shall laugh in heaven.48
Of course this kind of ridicule was not taken seriously, but it did raise the question of 
what kind of speech the Queen should give and if apologies for the past should be 
included in it. Again opinions differed. Some saw the visit as an excellent opportunity 
once and for all to end the erratic manifestations of a tom national soul. Others thought 
excuses were nonsense because no actions had been committed that required any 
excuse, nor had the Indonesians asked for apologies or confessions from their former 
colonial masters.
When Queen Beatrix gave her speech, on August 21, she did not offer open 
apologies but read out the following two crucial sentences: "Holland was at first not 
prepared to accept the Indonesian endeavor towards complete and immediate 
independence. Because of this, the separation between our countries has become a long 
process, that has cost much pain and bitter struggle."49 The identities of the persons 
who wrote the speech are not clear, but it must have been the work of foreign affairs 
officials, for the most part, assisted by some prominent Dutch historians. Most political 
parties in the Netherlands reacted favorably to the chosen wording. Only Groen Links 
(Green Left), a small opposition party, declared itself to be disappointed by the lack of 
explicit apologies. Also the well-known Dutch publicist, Rudy Kousbroek, expressed 
disappointment: "what we blame the Japanese for, we now do ourselves."50 The critics 
were clearly in the minority.
Meanwhile, in Indonesia a poll had been launched by the progressive weekly, 
Forum, to measure public reaction to the apology issue. According to this poll, 67 
percent of the older generation Indonesians wanted Holland to apologize, and among
47 Volkskrant, August 16,1995; The source asserting that there were 150 deaths can be found in Bank, 
Excessennota, p. 83.
48 NRC, March 3,1995.
49 Volkskrant, August 22,1995.
50 NRC, August 22,1995. Rudy Kousbroek is a prolific publicist and novelist, who was bom and raised in 
the Dutch East Indies, who through his polemical articles has become quite influential in shaping Dutch 
public opinion on colonial matters. One of his recent books is Het Oostindisch kampsyndroom (Amsterdam: 
Meulenhoff, 1992), which contains a number of essays that appeared on earlier occasions in the NRC 
newspaper and the weekly Vrij Nederland.
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the younger generation the proportion rose to 74 percent.51 These reports on public 
opinion in Indonesia were published shortly before the arrival of the Queen, and were 
apparently intended to increase the pressure on the Dutch guests.
The question whether the Dutch royal family should be present in Jakarta on 
August 17,1995 at the ceremony celebrating the fifty years' anniversary of Indonesian 
independence was another issue widely debated. Already in January the weekly, Vrij 
Nederland, had announced that the Queen would not be present on this date.52 Several 
reasons lay behind this decision, although these were never officially explained. One 
reason probably had to do with pressure from veteran groups, energized since the 
Princen incident and very effective in their manipulation of the press. It was 
announced in May that veterans were to be given an official role to play in the 
program during the Queen's visit to Indonesia.53 The other reason was of a more 
fundamental nature: the presence of the Dutch Queen in Indonesia on August 17 
would give the impression that the Dutch government did not recognize December 27, 
1949, the date of the transfer of power, as the true starting point of independent 
Indonesia, but now instead recognized Indonesia's own proclamation of 
independence, which had been announced more than four years earlier, as the crucial 
date. In a symbolic way the contemporary Dutch government would thus discredit the 
frenetic attempts by earlier Dutch governments to hold on to Indonesia after the 
Second World War.
The Dutch royal visit was postponed until August 21, yet on August 17 con­
gratulations from the Dutch government to Indonesia, offered by Prime Minister W. 
Kok, were broadcast on Indonesian television.54 At the end of August, when the royal 
visit was concluded, discussion about whether the Queen should have arrived on 
August 17 and not August 21 arose again in the newspapers. The historian J. Bank 
asserted that the choice made was the correct one, contending that the celebration of 
August 17 was above all intended to serve as a public display of unity among Indone­
sian citizens; its function as commemoration of a historic event was less significant. 
The presence of the Queen on that day would thus do more to display the Dutch 
people's preoccupation with their own history than to accomplish anything the 
Indonesian hosts would desire or encourage.55 Others, including the already men­
tioned Rudy Kousbroek, deplored the absence of the Queen on this crucial date be­
cause they thought one symbolic act would have put the historical record straight.56 
And of course for once Kousbroek was right: a royal presence on August 17 would 
have been greatly appreciated by the Indonesian government, even though it would 
have provoked furious reactions both among Dutch veterans' groups as well as from 
progressives in Holland who believed that the Indonesian officials would exploit such 
an event to prop up their own domestic prestige.
51 Volkskrant, August 21,1995.
52 Vrij Nederland, January 14,1995. A spokesman for the state information service is reported to have 
stated: "The Indonesians consider the 17th as a national celebration day. No other head of state is invited. 
If a country celebrates its independence, in itself we have nothing to do with that." p. 8.
53 NRC, May 20,1995.
54 NRC, August 17,1995.
55 NRC, August 29,1995.
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The visit of Queen Beatrix itself was widely covered in the Dutch newspapers, 
which communicated the impression that the event had been marred by human rights 
abuses and lapses in protocol. Hardly had the royal family set foot on Indonesian soil 
when alarming messages started to circulate that the Indonesian government intended 
to execute seven prisoners, among them two former palace guards of Sukarno, 
Bungkus and Marsudi.56 7 This message followed in the wake of the release of Suban- 
drio, Sukarno's Foreign Affairs minister, who had been jailed for large-scale financial 
wrongdoings, and coincided with the pardon of 26,000 prisoners in honor of the 
Republic's fiftieth anniversary. Thus, according to a haunting comment in the 
Volkskrant, "two indigenous ghosts are traveling within the queen's retinue."58
With regard to the protocol, there were reports in the Dutch newspapers that the 
Indonesian government, at a very late moment, changed important parts of the official 
program. A private lunch between the Dutch and Indonesian head of state was 
canceled, the Queen had to stay in a Padang hotel with the message "Indonesia 
merdeka" spelled out in light bulbs on the roof, and the visit to the Sultan of 
Yogyakarta was shortened markedly.59 Many other rather awkward surprises were 
reported as well. During an official ceremony at the Indonesian military graveyard, 
Kalibata, seven Dutch war veterans were present but their Indonesian counterparts did 
not show up.60 That same ceremony was missed by the Dutch Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Van Mierlo, because his escort, consisting of only one motorcycle policeman, 
had an engine breakdown.61 The final meeting between Suharto, Ibu Tien, the Dutch 
royal couple, and the Dutch Crown Prince took only twenty-five minutes.62
Were the lapses in protocol carefully orchestrated by unnamed Indonesian 
authorities? There have been many situations in history where Dutch-Indonesian 
official contacts provoked a subtle protocol battle. Or is it more likely that Dutch news 
reports of protocol embarrassments largely reflected the paranoia of the Dutch, a 
paranoia stirred up by relevant public debates during the months preceding the royal 
visit? One NRC editor was particularly outspoken on what had happened: in his 
opinion, Holland had suffered a "shattering humiliation" in Indonesia.63
Concluding remarks
The year 1995 invited the Dutch newspaper readers to gaze down on a confused 
battlefield where advocates fought to defend their views on Indonesia and the Dutch 
colonial national past. In one way, the Netherlands' collective mental unresolvedness 
regarding its traumatic past is not unique; in other ways, it is. In America in the mid- 
1960s, the Vietnam war acquired unprecedented immediacy because of daily on-the- 
spot television coverage. But, as Andrew Martin recently observed, in tire beginning of
56 NRC, August 22,1995.
57Volkskrant and NRC, August 19,1995; NRC, August 22,1995.
58 Volkskrant, August 24,1995.
59 NRC, August 31,1995.
60 NRC, August 21,1995.
61 NRC, August 26,1995.
62 NRC, August 23,1995.
63 NRC, August 29,1995.
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the 1970s the flow of images halted and a stifling silence followed, known as the "Big 
Chill." A kind of "cultural paralysis" set in because of the unwillingness of Americans 
to face what had happened and, in the words of Peter Marin, "to determine in the light 
of the past our moral obligations for the future."64 Since that time, however, Vietnam 
has reappeared in American popular culture, confronting audiences in movies like 
"Platoon" (1985). On other levels, the discourse on Vietnam has evolved into a force 
that affects both national policy—US foreign policy—and individual identities—the 
changeable identification of Vietnam veterans as "crybabies, dutiful sons, dangerous 
misfits, or patriotic warriors."65
To take another example, the French nightmare involving Algeria still lingers on, 
though dimly. The monumental Histoire de la France Coloniale (1990) only contains two 
rather confused pages on the Algerian trauma and the memory of the decolonization. 
It records how the former French combatants in Algeria prefer to keep silent rather 
than to recount their experiences, and suggests that their will to keep silent is caused 
by both shame, because they were defeated, and a bad conscience, because it was an 
unequal war. "These sentiments," the French authors maintain, "are in any case those 
of the French people in general."66 France, they continue, cannot suppress this 
disgraceful part of its history. Yet every "honest historian" can establish that after 1962 
France understood that it should continue to give aid to Algeria for humanitarian, not 
self-interested, reasons. Finally, the authors maintain, it is not the habit of university 
historians to take into account the literature of "necrophagous" publicists who live on 
pseudo-revelations of forgotten scandals.67 One can ask whether these last digressions 
accurately reflect the collective opinion of French academic historians.
Examined in retrospect, the public exchange of ideas in Holland in 1995 showed a 
similarly complex chemistry of emotions. What stands out is that Holland's colonial 
past, the period 1945-1949 in particular, is as much taboo today as it was earlier. Why 
is this? It is caused first by the collective mental structure underlying the Dutch 
perception of their own national history. But also, certain catalysts—and plenty of 
these were available in 1995—energized public discussion, but ultimately failed to 
provoke more active explorations of Dutch colonial history.
The Dutch possess a strong historical awareness. They have been taught to think 
that certain collective values (tolerance, the pursuit of the "good," willingness to work) 
are expressed in their own national history. However, there have been periods of crisis 
in the past—the decolonization of Indonesia is a prime example—when the self-image 
of the Dutch people has been tarnished. The collective memory of these crises is 
painful and it heightens feelings of fallibility, to which the majority of the Dutch, 
thanks in part to their Calvinist traditions, are susceptible. This pain can be met in two 
ways, either by a refusal to acknowledge the guilty acts in the past or by a decision to 
spade them up and correct them in order to initiate a moral cleaning. The first response
64 Andrew Martin, Receptions o f War: Vietnam in American Culture (Norman and London: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1993), p. 10.
65 Martin, Receptions o f War, p. 9.
66 J. Thobie, G. Meynier, C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, Ch. R. Ageron, Histoire de la France Coloniale 1914-1990 
(Paris: Armand Colin, 1990), p. 552.
67 Thobie, Histoire de la France coloniale, p. 553.
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typifies the behavior of many veterans, supported by relatively conservative politicians 
and historians. The second answer is chosen by younger people, socialist politicians, 
and progressive historians.
During the year 1995, the press acted as the major vehicle mobilizing the hidden 
potentials of this collective Dutch mental structure. This year was a special one because 
of the many commemorations taking place: fifty years after the liberation from Nazi 
(or, in the case of the Indies, Japanese) rule, but also fifty years since Holland's last 
colonial war started. It resulted in a stream of popular publications, TV documentaries, 
and columns in newspapers, which in turn provoked intensified public debates on 
certain key historical issues. During the year there were also specific catalysts that 
appeared which had the power to spark debate about the colonial past, i.e. the visit of 
the "deserter" Poncke Princen to Holland, a renewed discussion of war crimes, and the 
official visit of Queen Beatrix to Indonesia.
The official visit of the Dutch Monarch to Indonesia was an exceptionally strong 
catalyst electrifying public discourse about the past. Next to the national soccer team, 
the Queen holds her place as an eminent Dutch national symbol. Her visit to Indonesia 
in 1995 was necessarily prefaced by a number of sensitive choices with regard to the 
national past. On what date she should go? What she would say about former 
relations? Which representatives from Dutch society would she take in her retinue? 
How would protocol be arranged? These were all issues that provoked intense public 
discussion before her departure. The visit of the Queen in a way "actualized" the 
troublesome colonial past because it could not wholly evade, through protocol or 
carefully worded speeches, a clear collective position that would allow the Dutch to 
stand firm in the present relative to their own past.
However, the exact extent of war crimes committed remained unresolved; the 
Dutch people have not yet even agreed that the term, "war crimes," can be used to 
describe atrocities that took place in 1945-49 in Indonesia. Neither the Queen nor 
Dutch parliament offered apologies for the wrongs of the colonial past. Finally, pro­
fessional historians in Holland have proven largely unable or unwilling to propose a 
more or less conclusive historical judgment on the colonial past. Such a historical 
judgment must include a moral point-of-view incorporating contemporary knowledge 
and perspectives.68
The essence of the contents of the public discussion in Holland in 1995 encom­
passed particular strings of signifiers. The most painful strand joined these words— 
"lost war—veterans and deserters—war crimes." The signifiers drat tagged discussion 
on 1945-49 included the words: "decolonization—political responsibility—apologies." 
Finally there was one strand of signifiers having to do with history, characterized by 
these terms: "colonial past—historical explanation—moral judgement." Some 
individuals spoke out on these issues, but most Dutchmen kept their mouths shut, 
skipped certain sections of their newspapers, and zapped their TVs to a fun channel.
68 I am not wholly convinced by the "postmoralistic" approach proposed by M. de Keizer in her recent 
article "Memory as Rite de Passage: Towards a Postmoralistic Historiography of the Second World War," 
Itinerario XX (1996-2): 118-127. A postmoralistic approach is only possible after the phase of moralism is 
over. Maybe postmoralism can be applied to World War II, but as far as Indonesia is concerned, most 
Dutchmen are still in the phase of denial.
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Finally, the year 1995 was distinguished by a non-event, when a timid public 
discussion found itself overwhelmed by silence.
